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PROVIDING JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN IN DISPUTED
ADOPTIONS: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
MEGHAN S. SKELTON*
The child's story is remarkably consistent in private disputed
adoptions. First, her mother, a young, unmarried woman finds
herself pregnant but is unwilling to consider abortion. Her father,
young as well, and willing to defer to the woman's decision, is
unable to take on the responsibility of a child, and so her mother
contacts an attorney to arrange a private adoption. The attorney
finds a family desperately eager to have a child, and the biological
mother and the family enter into a contract in which she consents
to relinquish her child to them for adoption. After the child is
born, the biological mother once more agrees to the adoption
and, within a matter of days, the baby is within the adoptive
family's custody.
At this point, the biological mother revokes her consent. She
misses her child, learns that her family would have supported
her, and believes that if she had fully understood the situation,
she never would have consented to the surrender in the first
place.1 In the meantime, however, the infant has started to
become attached to the adoptive family. The "contractually formed
structure of contrived kinship" 2 is transformed into a nuclear
family with all the affection and caring associated with everyday
biological families.
Traditional family law assigns rights to the child and parents,
which, at this stage, conflict. The adoptive parents have contrac-
tual rights in enforcing the adoption, the biological parents have
due process and privacy rights in raising their child,3 and the
* J.D. Candidate 1995, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
A.B. 1992, Duke University.
1. See H. DAVID KIRK, ADOPTIVE KINSHIP, A MODERN INSTITUTION IN NEED OF REFORM
116 (1981), for one woman's personal story of her reasons for surrendering her daughter
for adoption in which she discusses family and societal pressures as well as her interest
in ensuring the best possible future for her child. Most likely due to her youth, the
woman's first concerns were for her own welfare. Her concern for the child was secondary.
She later regretted her choice.
2. Id. at 39.
3. Because adoption statutes have the effect of creating new family units, removing
rights and obligations from biological families, and transferring the rights and duties to
adoptive parents, see, e.g., infra part II.B., these due process rights also eventually vest
in the adoptive parents. It is unclear and problematic to determine when due process
rights vest in the adoptive parents, however, because custody changes and childrearing
begin prior to a final decree of adoption. See infra text accompanying notes 89-96.
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child has privacy rights in remaining in a functioning family in
order to satisfy her overriding need for continuity.4 The care and
concern that parents give their children through the process of
educating them, supporting them, and training them to be mem-
bers of society strengthen and enhance the community. 5 As such,
the legal system grants familial interests constitutional protec-
tion.6 In disputed adoptions, multiple families with divergent
interests are involved. Courts attempt to resolve the conflicting
rights of the various members of families when deciding to whom
to award custody in a disputed adoption.
Attempting to resolve the conflicting rights through the tra-
ditional method, however, is an inherently flawed approach. The
current legal paradigm of viewing disputes in terms of conflicting
rights requires the resolution of problems "through male inquiries
formulated from distanced, abstract, and acontextual vantage
points."7 Rights are based on individual autonomy and each per-
son's separation from others in society.8 Such concern with au-
tonomy is incompatible with resolving adoption disputes. Clearly
a child, dependent on his or her parents for survival, is not a
fully autonomous individual. By virtue of the fact that adoptions
attempt to place children in a family, the relationship, not auton-
omy, must be valued above the separation and autonomy that
rights analysis stresses. Reliance on abstract theory does not
produce just results. Justice is more likely when the court ex-
pands the facts and relationships that it examines in deciding an
adoption.9 Such an approach, focusing on the relationships and
context of each individual situation, is endorsed by feminist
jurisprudence.10
Feminist jurisprudence approaches the law from the perspec-
tive of women." A female perspective of conflict resolution em-
4. Albert J. Solnit, Psychological Dimensions in Child Placement Conflicts, 12 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 495, 499 (1984).
5. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983).
6. Id.
7. Leslie Bender. A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 3, 10-11 (1988).
8. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica.
tion, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 546 (1986).
9. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373, 1380 (1986).
10. Bender, supra note 7, at 12-13; see also Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Justice and Gender,
79 CAL. L. REV. 577, 582 (1991) (reviewing DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989))
("Rights discourse ... is too concerned with the individual and thus is not compatible
with ... women's orientation toward collectivity and a web of relationships:').
11. Epstein, supra note 10, at 580 & n.19. Though women clearly have many different
perspectives, feminist jurisprudence attempts to draw upon those experiences that are
common among women.
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phasizes "connection, subjectivity, and responsibility." 12 Whereas
young girls tend to develop a morality of responsibility based on
psychological and emotional links, young boys develop a system
of problem solving that depends upon individuality and separation
from others.13 Feminist jurisprudence draws upon women's ap-
proach to morality and conflict resolution, and thus enables the
legal system to protect against what women perceive as harms-
harms to relationships and connections to others. Traditional
patriarchal jurisprudence protects against what society (men)
perceives to be harmful-threats to individuality. Individuality
is not threatened in disputed adoptions -relationships are. Unlike
traditional patriarchal jurisprudence, feminist jurisprudence
speaks to the issues surrounding relationships that arise in adop-
tion cases.
A majority of states now use some form of a "best interests
of the child" test in resolving custody in disputed adoptions. 14
Such a test can be consistent with a feminist approach when
properly applied. The factors that different jurisdictions use to
determine the best interests of the child, however, remain varied
and inconsistent. Some courts combine a presumption in favor of
awarding custody to biological parents with a superficial assess-
ment of the child's interests.15 Other jurisdictions focus on the
notion of psychological parenthood or the affection relationships
between the child and the parent figure.1" This approach values
the connection between child and caregiver, examining context
and relationships in deciding the custody dispute. This latter
approach, a true best interests analysis, thus employs analysis
consistent with a perspective that values women's experience.
12. Sherry, supra note 8, at 582; see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982) (explaining male and female conflict resolution styles).
13. See infra notes 60, 127-35 and accompanying text.
14. Arnold D. Litt, Note, Adoption-Psychologila v. Biological Parenthood in Deter-
mining the Best Interests of the Child-In re P. & Wife, 3 SETON HALL L. REv., 130, 133
(1971) ("The majority position has been that while caution should be exercised in severing
the child-parent relationship, the welfare of the child is the dominant consideration.").-
15. See, e.g., In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 355 (D.C. App. 1992) ("Presumptively, a natural
parent has a right to the companionship, care and custody of his or her children."); see
also In re Adoption of BGD, 719 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Wyo. 1986) ("[Biological] parents have
the first and natural right to their children.") (quoting In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d
481, 485 (Wyo. 1976)).
16. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973);
see also In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988) ("The court should prefer a psychological
parent ... over any claimant (including a natural parent) who, from the child's perspective,
is not a psychological parent.").
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This Note explores how feminist jurisprudence serves the ends
of justice to the child in custody determinations in disputed
private adoptions. It explores whether the children's true best
interests are adequately preserved during protracted disputed
private adoptions in the current patriarchal, rights-based system.
Section I examines the nature and value of an attachment be-
tween children and their caregivers. Section II considers the
traditional due process rights of the parents and adoptive parents
in family settings and adoption statutes. Section III explains
different feminist approaches to the law. Section IV identifies
the tests courts employ in determining custody in disputed adop-
tions, and how a feminist approach might address the same
disputes. Section V suggests options available to the courts to
better ensure a custody determination in the child's true best
interests and sets forth the benefits of a feminist analysis. Section
VI concludes that currently, under the patriarchal system of
rights analysis, it is too easy for the courts to avoid a satisfactory
determination of the child's best interests in disputed private
adoptions. In order for the courts to be more responsive to the
true party of interest, the child, they must focus on the attach-
ment relationship between the child and the parent figure.
I. INFANT-ADULT RELATIONSHIPS
Psychologists accept as a "principle of child development that
a warm, nurturing, and consistent relationship between infant
and parents is essential for healthy psychological development."'17
An attachment is the reflection of the emotional tie between
infant and parents." Infants are not capable of feeling an attach-
ment to caregivers immediately after birth. Rather, an infant's
attachment to her caregiver develops gradually during the first
few months of life 9 In the first eight to twelve weeks, an infant
does not prefer one caregiver over another because she is unable
to recognize faces. 20 Between three and six months, however, the
infant learns to recognize faces, begins to prefer individual car-
17. Susan B. G. Campbell & Paul M. Taylor, Bonding and Attachment: Theoretical
Issues, in PARENT-INFANT RELATIONSHIPS 3 (Paul M. Taylor ed., 1980).
18. Id. at 4.
19. Melvin Konner, Biological Aspects of the Mother-Infant Bond, in THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ATTACHMENT AND AFFILIATIVE SYSTEMS 137, 153 (Robert N. Emde & Robert J. Harmon
eds., 1982) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATTACHMENT].
20. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL GROWTH AND THE
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 54, 62 (1980).
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egivers, and becomes wary of strangers.2' During this process,
the infant develops a "relatively enduring emotional tie to another
person' ' which she demonstrates by trying to be near that
person, by expressing sadness and depression when that person
leaves, by experiencing joy and relief when the person returns,
and by "being oriented toward that person even when not in
close proximity."2 An example of such orientation is listening
for the voice of the individual to whom the child becomes at-
tached.24
The value of the attachment and affection relationship between
an adult and an infant is extensive. The most significant aspect
of the relationship is that attachment is a mechanism that meets
the infant's immediate survival needs.25 Attachment grows as a
result of an adult's gratification of the needs of the child by
feeding, holding, rocking, and caring for the child.2 Through the
affection relationship, the infant is able to communicate with the
caregiver, and the caregiver is able to respond to the infant's
needs more satisfactorily than anyone else. The tie between the
infant and adult enables interaction in the absence of language;
the caregiver can identify what the infant desires and is best
able to provide the infant with satisfaction. 27 In order to develop,
children need to be able to feel some sense of control over their
environment, which is provided through the attachment to an
adult.28
The value of an infant's attachment extends beyond the first
survival requirements of the child. A number of studies suggest
that the quality of the attachment between infant and caregiver
influences the child's later "social, affective, and cognitive devel-
opment."29 Children who have secure attachments as infants later
display more competence in problem solving,30 more cooperation
21. Id
22. Id. at 53.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 4748; see also Nicholas Anastaiow, Attachment Research and Mental Health:
A Speculation, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 19, at 295, 296 (proposing
that attachment has "survival value" for infants).
26. Id. at 48.
27. Id at 66-67.
28. See id. ("Children need adults as their agents, and children's sense of control
depends on the adult's noticing and understanding the children's signals and on their
carrying out the necessary reciprocal actions."). Control aids the child by enabling her to
predict an adult's response. Id. at 71.
29. Campbell & Taylor, supra note 17, at 18.
30. Id. at 17.
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with unfamiliar adults, more social competence when interacting
with peers, and more "ego control and ego resiliency.' 'a
The child's attachment to an adult is a source of comfort to
the child. A major sign of attachment is the infant's ability to
physically move to the object of attachment for comfort.s In
addition, attachment has significant implications for a child's
ability to manage separation 3 The attachment relationship is
soothing and calming to the infant when she is tired or stressed.
Separation from the object of attachment agitates the child. 4 A
child's protest to separation is strongest during the first half of
the second year, but continues through the child's second birth-
day. 5 During the second year, children become more comfortable
with separation from the object of attachment, but will regress,
behaving as they did during earlier stages of development, if
they are separated from their parents or experience other dis-
ruption of their attachment.3 6
Psychologists and psychiatrists agree that great risks to the
child are associated with the disruption of the parent-child rela-
tionship.3 Considering the adverse effect of separation and the
implications of attachment on cognitive and social development,
disturbances in the attachment relationship can have severe and
detrimental clinical ramifications for the child.s When a child's
ability to form an attachment prior to the age of three is hindered,
he or she may develop "affectionless psychopathy syndrome,"
which renders an adult unable to feel guilt and incapable of
forming significant attachments3 9 This disorder has been associ-
ated with early separation and loss.40 Other potential psycholog-
ical effects include "criminality, personality disorders, cognitive
difficulties, and depression."41
31. Michael E. Lamb, Parent-Infant Interaction, Attachment, and Socioemotional De-
velopment in Infancy, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATTACHMENT, supra note 19, at 206.
32. See MACCOBY, supra note 20, at 53.
33. Id. at 61, 70.
34. Id. at 54-55.
35. Id. at 56.
36. Id. at 61.
37. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1014 (La. 1988).
38. Campbell & Taylor, supra note 17, at 18.
39. Everett Waters & Donna M. Noyes, Psychological Parenting vs. Attachnwnt Theory:
The Child's Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right Things for the Wrong Reasons,
12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 505, 511 (1984).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 510; see also Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents
in Child Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 450-51 (1976) (explaining that
disruption in custody of infants may lead to "problems and delays in the infant's
orientation and adaptation to surroundings").
DISPUTED ADOPTIONS
The attachment and affection relationship between an infant
and caregiver leads to the formation of a "psychological parent"
relationship.4 2 There is general consensus among child psycholo-
gists that a parent-child relationship demonstrating "mutual in-
teraction between adult and child described in terms of love,
attention, basic trust, and confidence" 43 exists and plays a critical
role in child development. 44 Biology, however, does not determine
the identity of the psychological parent. There is no inherent
connection between biology and the psychological relationship
between infant and adult. "The newborn does not necessarily
need the blood tie adult as parent, but does need an adult who
wants her on a continuing permanent basis, an adult who will
safeguard her from her own helplessness and from the risks and
dangers in her environment." 45 The object of attachment "need
not be the biological mother: Adopted children become firmly
attached to their adoptive mothers."46 Biology is, therefore, less
relevant than caretaking when determining the existence of an
attachment.
The biological connection between a child and the natural
parent does not necessarily lead to the psychological parent
relationship. It instead creates an "inchoate parent-child relation-
ship" which merely offers the opportunity to create an attach-
ment.47 Attachment stems from the day-to-day care of the infant
and the communication and affection between adult- and child;
"only a parent who provides for these needs will build a 'psy-
chological relationship to the child ... and will become the psy-
chological parent' in whose care the child can feel valued and
'wanted.' ' 48 The relationships between parent and child are the
"essential ingredients of the family" which is "our basic social
unit ... inextricably associated with survival for children and
with the satisfaction of the adult's yearning for closeness and
affirmation.149 The child's best interests are served by remaining
in a stable, functioning family where an attachment can evolve
42. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 22.
43. Litt, supra note 14, at 135.
44. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1014 (La. 1988).
45. Solnit, supra note 4. at 496.
46. MACCOBY, supra note 20, at 54.
47. Gregory S. Hilderbran, Note, In Re Baby Girl Eason: Balancing Three Competing
Interests in Third Party Adoptions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1217, 1228 & n.62 (1988).
48. GOLDSTEIN E&" AL., supra note 16, at 17.
49. Solnit, supra note 4, at 497.
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which will in turn allow for the healthy emotional and cognitive
development of the child.0
It is important to note that in adoption situations the initial
change in custody from the birth mother to the adoptive family
generally occurs long before any attachment between the infant
and biological parent has formed. In fact, the custody transfer
generally occurs soon after birth, about three months before the
infant is capable of forming an attachment, prior to the devel-
opmental stage in which an infant can differentiate between faces.
One need not be concerned, therefore, that the initial change in
custody carries the same potential for harm as later disturbances
in the parent-child relationship.
In addition, children are not always irreparably destroyed by
separation when mitigating circumstances exist. Children may
have multiple mother figures and form new attachments during
infancy. 1 If the quality of the mother-substitute is high, providing
love, attention, and affection of the same intensity, new affection
relationships can form.2 Children can have more than one affec-
tion relationship and many factors may mitigate the loss of a
parent-figure such as peer relationships, school, family, and adult
love relationships. 3 Though some studies have indicated that the
severity of the loss may be mitigated, the context was one in
which the children were reunited with the original mother figure,
and the recovery was possible when the reunion was within three
months of the separation.4 The long term effects of such a loss
are unclear.55 These studies, therefore, do not provide much help
in the adoption arena, in which separation and loss of the attach-
ment to the adoptive family is permanent. There is no reunion
between the child and mother figure, with the possible exception
of limited visitation rights.
II. DUE PROCESS FOR PARENTS
The psychological parent relationship between a caregiver and
child raises the interests of the child in remaining with the object
50. Id. at 499. "The clear implication of the psychological data is that a child's best
interests are promoted by the creation and retention of strong and secure ties to a caring
parent or guardian." Note, supra note 41, at 451.
51. See Litt, supra note 14, at 140 ("The quality of substitute maternal care was shown
to influence the severity of the separation reaction.").
52. Id.
53. See Waters & Noyes, supra note 39, at 512.
54. Litt, supra note 14, at 140.
55. Id,
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of affection. Under a traditional analysis, the parents, both adop-
tive and biological, have due process interests distinct from the
child's concern of maintaining the affection relationship. Due
process cannot be precisely defined. Rather, it is a continuum
which covers an individual's freedom from arbitrarily imposed
restraints by the states, and which also recognizes that certain
individual interests require increased scrutiny of the state's jus-
tification for the restraints. Due process is the constitutional
safeguard based upon respect for individual liberty balanced with
the demands of organized society. 57 Courts determine a due
process right by examining the claim in light of the "relevant
precedents and ... the several interests that are at stake."cs
The current legal system's promotion of due process rights is
"premised on the model of an autonomous, fully competitive
individual."59 The value of autonomy and separation reflect the
moral development of males which is a process of separating
from others by viewing problems in the abstract and applying
clear rules that resolve otherwise thorny questions 0 Rights
reflect a male perspective of formality and hierarchy, which is
characterized by objectivity, distance, and abstraction.61 Due proc-
ess analysis avoids emotions, instincts, and ethics, viewing dis-
putes in a vacuum. 62
Current masculine jurisprudence values autonomy and protects
against intrusion upon an individual's separate sphere.6 3 Freedom
in current patriarchal jurisprudence means the establishment of
rights in each individual so that no other may encroach upon
one's individuality." Conflict arises because each individual has
autonomy and rights discrete and separate from everyone else,
which by definition means that one person's ends are not anoth-
er's.65 The entire patriarchal legal system was established to
56. Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977)).
57. Id. at 1021.
58. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (stating that applying
the due process clause is not a precise science, but is an "uncertain enterprise").
59. Joan M. Shaughnessy, Gilligan's Travels, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 12 (1988).
60. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 24-63.
61. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER, 319
(Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) [hereinafter FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY].
62. Bender, supra note 7, at 33.
63. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1988).
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id.
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regulate interfering interests rather than to work toward a
common goal; rather than utilizing the legal system to ennoble
society, the legal system's primary use is to establish a lowest
common denominator between interfering individual rights.6 Once
again, this masculine jurisprudence relegates relationships and
context to the background, and may even ignore relationships
and context altogether.67
A. Traditional Jurisprudence of Biological Parents' Rights
The Supreme Court has long recognized that parents have a
constitutionally protected due process interest in the care of
their children. Justice Rutledge wrote that it was "cardinal ...
that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prep-
aration for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."
The Supreme Court elaborated on the due process rights of a
parent in Stanley v. Illinois. 9 The Court concluded that a pre-
sumption that a father is an unfit parent simply because he did
not marry the mother of his children is a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.70 Under current Fourteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence, the government must afford parental rights great
respect. This is an individual right, distinct from any other person
that might be involved with the child or the child herself. The
state will defer to and protect a man's interest in the children
he fathered and raised unless there is a compelling contrary
interest.7 1 The Court exalted a parent's interest "in the compan-
ionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children"
and described the right to childrearing as "essential" and more
dear than property rights.72 The Court was quick to analogize to
property rights, but failed to focus on the child's relationship
with her parent. In addition, the Court recognized that parental
due process rights arise even in atypical family settings; the
Constitution recognizes family rights even where there has been
no marriage.73
66. Sherry, supra note 8, at 558-59.
67. Id. at 54445; see also Scales, supra note 9, at 1383 ("Objectivity ignores context.").
68. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
69. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
70. Id. at 649.
71. Id. at 651.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 652; see also Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that
a woman who was guardian of her two half-siblings had due process rights in the custody
of the children; she had a liberty interest in preserving her family).
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In Stanley, the state argued that the best interests of the child
would be served by implementing a presumption of unfitness for
unwed fathers.7 4 The Court concluded that this presumption,
though efficient, comes at too high a cost to the individual's
rights. Efficiency is subordinate to one's due process rights.7
Once the due process right has been established, the quantum of
process must be determined. Stanley indicates that the process
is measured by weighing "the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as ... the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action."76 The state's interest in effi-
ciently seeing to the child's best interests is subordinate to the
parent's interest in raising his or her child. The advantage to
the state when it utilizes such a presumption, rather than an
individualized hearing on the fitness of a parent, is an inadequate
justification to refuse a father a hearing when the state is
dismembering his family.77
The Court essentially devised an equation to calculate Mr.
Stanley's due process interest. The rights were decided through
a masculine process of abstract logic, ignoring context and the
relationship between Illinois, Mr. Stanley, and his children. 78 The
Court was constrained by the due process explanation that par-
ents have individual rights in their children. The individuality of
due process eliminates the role of the relationship between chil-
dren and parents. This relationship, however, is the core of the
child's world. The child, however, is not a part of the due process
calculus except as a right of a parent. The Court could have
reached the same substantive decision, awarding custody to the
father, by addressing the importance of the parent-child relation-
ship. The decision based on process abstracts the child out of
the Court's consideration. The focus on due process enables the
Court to ignore the child's emotional and developmental future.
74. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647, 653 n.5.
75. Id. at 656 ("IThe Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.").
76. Id. at 650-51 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
77. Id. at 658. But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), in which a
California statute presumed that the husband of the mother is the father of the child,
absent a showing of his infertility. The Supreme Court found that the overriding social
policy in protecting the family unit takes precedence over the biological father's interest.
Id. at 119-20; see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (explaining that biology alone
does not create a fully vested liberty interest). In addition, the putative biological father's
interests were still protected in that the statute allowed him to make a showing that he
had an interest in the child that merits visitation. Id. at 115-16.
78. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
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Though clearly establishing a parental due process right, Stan-
ley did not address situations in which there are more substantial
countervailing interests. Such a countervailing interest may be
the child's best interests. Quilloin v. Walcott"9 involved a biolog-
ical father who provided neither financial nor emotional assistance
in raising his child nor took any steps to legitimize the child."'
He claimed that utilizing a best interests test in the adoption
proceeding of his child did not adequately protect his parental
due process rights.8' The Court concluded that the child's coun-
tervailing right of living in a stable family unit, which was already
in place, did not violate the father's due process rights. The state
could allow the adoption because the child's rights were at least
equally as important as the father's. 82 The Court reached a result
that protected the relationship between the child and caregiver,
but the decision balanced rights rather than valuing the relation-
ship on its own.
The father, in a situation like Quilloin, may be characterized
as an innocent victim. His parental rights were terminated based
on the child's rights, not on his own due process interest in his
family. He apparently did nothing to warrant the termination of
his parental rights. Such a characterization, however, is consti-
tutionally inaccurate. In order for a parent to possess a due
process right in the family, more than a mere biological relation-
ship with the child is necessary. 3 The father must display a
commitment to the child by actively participating in supporting
and raising the child The biological connection allows the father
a chance that no other man has to establish the relationship, and
thus the due process right, with the child. 8 The Court may look
to the relationship, but it does so only to find a right. It is not
the relationship that the Court protects; the due process right
remains the core of the Court's analysis.
79. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
80. Id. at 249.
81. Id. at 254.
82. Id- at 255. In addition to the child's best interests, the state's interest in protecting
the relationship between husband and wife may be another countervailing interest
sufficient to outweigh a biological father's due process interest. The Court prefers
presuming legitimacy to allowing a stranger to the marriage to claim parental rights
over a child of the marriage. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-20 (1989).
83. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) ("[T]he mere existence of a biological
link does not merit ... constitutional protection.").
84. Id.
85. Id. at 262 (If the father "grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship.").
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An inchoate parental relationship is given some constitutional
safeguards8 6 The courts award notice, at a minimum, to allow
parents an opportunity to form a parental relationship.8 7 The
state, however, need not go to unfettered lengths to ensure that
each putative father be aware of his child's adoption, because
the father's inchoate parental rights cannot interfere with the
other significant interests in the adoption process, such as the
privacy of the mother, unnecessary controversy, or threatened
finality of adoption decrees.P
B. Due Process for Custodial and Pre-Adoptive Parents
One of the deficiencies of a rights analysis is that it leaves
open the question of when due process rights vest in the custo-
dian of a child. Custody alone is not parenthood, 89 but foster
parents and prospective adoptive parents do have some limited
due process interests in the children whom they are raising.90
Foster parents do not have the same degree of liberty interests
in the children placed in their homes as biological or adoptive
parents because the relationship is finite.9' From the beginning
of the relationship, foster families know their relationship with
the children is likely to end because such a termination is estab-
lished clearly in both the state statutes and the contracts exe-
cuted by the foster parents. 92 According to masculine
jurisprudence, the expectations and privileges surrounding the
relationship are determined by state law because the foster
relationship is a creature of state law.93
Families embarking on adoption, however, have expectations
and rights different from foster families. Adoptive parents are
awarded custody of the child before the legal status of the child
is transformed, thereby giving public sanction to the new family
unit. Pre-adoptive parents do not expect their relationship with
the child to end, but "[t]o the contrary, the very motive of the
86. Id. at 263.
87. Id. at 264.
88. Id.
89. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972).
90. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835,
857 (5th Cir. 1977) ('T]he foster parents having a close familial relationship during the
first years of [the] child's life and the child himself have a protectable interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment which cannot be denied them without due process of law.").
91. Id.
92. Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1979).
93. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977).
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prospective adoptive parents, as well as the State, is to secure
a life-long relationship between the adoptive parents and the
child."94 Before the adoption is finalized, pre-adoptive parents
have rights no other person has, such as the right to petition to
finalize the adoption. 95 The prospective adoptive couple, therefore,
has a constitutionally protected interest in the child, though
limited.9
The key word with respect to the prospective adoptive parent's
liberty interest is "limited." As such, the state's interests in the
child's welfare may supersede those of the adoptive parent.
The State, not the parents, is empowered by statute to watch
over the best interest of the child ... the state agency may
terminate the placement at any time the agency finds such a
move would be in the best interest of the child. Thus ... the
relationship between the State and the child must be consid-
ered paramount to the relationship between the prospective
adoptive parents and the child.9
The state cannot claim such a paramount relationship with the
child over the child's relationship with his or her natural or
adoptive parents.98 Once the parent-child relationship is formed
legally, the state's interests are no longer dominant. Therefore,
"[t]he parent-child relationship, whether natural or formalized
through adoption, properly forms the core of the constitutional
notion of 'family'.""
C. A Survey of Statutory Consent Provisions
The adults' due process rights are just a portion of the tools
used in the current system to determine custody. Statutes also
establish rights. To protect birth parents' rights, the birth par-
ents' consent must be given freely to ensure the validity of the
adoption. In addition, contractual rights yield to superior due
process rights in raising children. Adoption statutes, therefore,
tend to allow a birth parent a period of time in which to revoke
consent to the surrender.100
94. Thelen v. Catholic Social Servs., 691 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
95. Id. at 1185.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1186.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
99. Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d Cir. 1982).
100. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. States appear to consider that 4doptive
parents' due process rights do not vest until there is a decree of adoption, rather than
when custody changes.
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An overview of several states' adoption statutes indicates
several different approaches in statutory consent provisions. Some
allow a natural parent to revoke consent only within a certain
period of time. Usually, there is a statutorily defined number of
days or a requirement that the revocation be before either a
final or interlocutory decree of adoption 10 ' Some states within
this category phrase the statute negatively, indicating a disap-
proval of revocation. 0 2 The shortest period is ten days0 3 and the
longest is forty-five. 04
Another approach is to disallow revocation altogether, unless
the revoking party can show fraud, duress, or some cause for
invalidating consent.0 5 Two states explicitly deny any presump-
tion in favor of the biological parents.06 Only one state allows
an absolute right to revoke consent, but limits the time period
to fifteen days. 07
Most states include some consideration of the child's best
interests in the adoption statutes. In these states, the revocation
must be before a decree of adoption, and will be granted only if
the court finds that removal from the adoptive family is in the
best interests of the child. 08 Statutes, however, do not define
101. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW S 5-311(c) (1957) (stating that consent may be
revoked "within 30 calendar days after the required consent to an adoption is riled under
this section, or any time before a final decree of adoption is entered, whichever occurs
first").
102. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. S 48-11 (1991):
(a) No consent described ... may be revoked by the consenting party:
(1) After the entering of an interlocutory decree.
(2) After the entering of a final order of adoption when the entering of an
interlocutory decree has been waived ....
(3) After 30 days from the date of the giving of the consent ....
103. ARK. CODE ANN. S 9-9-209(b)(1) (Michie 1987); MINN. STAT. S 259.24(6a) (1992).
104. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW S 115-b-3(a) (McKinney 1988).
105. See IND. CODE ANN. S 31-6-53(1) (Burns 1994) ("[Consent is permanent and cannot
be revoked or set aside unless it was obtained by fraud or duress, or unless the parent
is incompetent."); see also OR. REV. STAT. S 109.312(2b) (1991) ("[Tlhe consent for adoption
may not be revoked unless fraud or duress is proved with respect to any material fact.").
106. One is Minnesota. See supra note 103. The other is Alabama. See ALA. CODE S 26-
10A-14(d) (1975) ("The court shall not apply any presumption or preference in favor of
the natural parents in reviewing an action .... :1.
107. TENN. CODE ANN. S 36-1417(b) (1991). The adoptive parents may file a petition
showing cause why the child should not be returned to the natural parents, at which
point "[tihe court shall award the guardianship of the child in accordance with the child's
best interest." TENN. CODE ANN. S 36-1-117(f)(6).
108. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. S 25.23.070(b) (1986) ("[Clonsent to adoption may be with-
drawn before the entry of a decree ... within 10 days after the consent is given ... [if
withdrawal is in the best interest of the person to be adopted."); see also HAW. REV.
STAT. S 578-2(f) (1985) (stating that there can be no withdrawal without "express approval
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what the courts should examine in determining the best interests
of the child. 1' 9
The statutory backdrop for disputed adoptions does not provide
a uniform or even a clear method of determining whether the
adoptive or biological parents should have custody of the child.
Consent is not absolute. In some states, there is no need to show
cause for revocation, but simply a time restriction within which
a biological parent may revoke consent. The time during which
a biological parent may revoke consent leaves the child in "legal
limbo." The biological parents have relinquished their rights but
may reclaim them, the adoptive family has accepted obligations
but is not yet protected, and the child is in the. custody of the
adoptive family where an attachment may be forming.10 This
aspect of the traditional approach may thwart the formation of
attachment relationships.
In other states, even after a decree of adoption is entered by
the courts, a showing of fraud will invalidate the consent."' The
statutes do not identify who must perpetrate the fraud in order
to invalidate consent. Clearly, if the adoptive family has exercised
some undue influence or duress over the biological parents, a
claim of fraud should stand. If, however, the fraud was committed
by some third party such as the biological father or a family
member of the natural mother, and the adoptive parents are not
a party to the fraud, their detrimental reliance on the consent
should estop a claim that fraud invalidates consent. In addition,
of the court ... that such action will be for the best interests of the individual to be
adopted"); MONT. CODE ANN. S 40-8-112 (1993) (providing that consent may be withdrawn
only if "the best interests of the child will be furthered thereby"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
S 170-B:10 (1991) (providing that consent may not be withdrawn "unless the court finds
... that the withdrawal is in the best interest of the person to be adopted"); N.D. CENT.
CODE S 14-15-08.2 (1991) (allowing consent to be withdrawn after notice if "the withdrawal
is in the best interest of the individual to be adopted"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, S
60.10.A (West Supp. 1994) (allowing withdrawal of consent only "if [the court] finds that
the best interest of the child will be furthered thereby"); S.C. CODE ANN. S 20-7-1720
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (disallowing withdrawal of consent "except when the court finds
that the withdrawal is in the best interests of the child and that the consent ... was not
given voluntarily or was obtained under duress or through coercion").
109. The exception is Rhode Island, where the courts are directed to "give primary
consideration to the [child's] physical, psychological, mental, and intellectual needs." R.I.
GEN. LAWS S 15-7-5(b)(2) (1956); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT S 402, 9A U.L.A.
561 (1988) (explaining that the child's best interests are determined by examining inter
alia the child's wishes, the interaction of the child with her parents, siblings, or others
who have a significant relationship with her, and the child's adjustment to her home,
school, and community).
110. See Hilderbran, supra note 47, at 1230.
111. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. S 109.312(2b) (1989).
DISPUTED ADOPTIONS
the statutes that focus on fraud do not all include time limita-
tions.112 To secure the best interests of the child, even if consent
were obtained through fraud, if a certain amount of time has
passed, the child's attachment to the adoptive family will have
developed and great harm will be caused by allowing the claim
of fraud to proceed." 3
Finally, in those states that qualify revocation on the best
interests of the child, little or no guidance is provided as to the
test to determine the best interests. In fact, the statutes do not
focus on the child. In such states it is possible for the courts to
overlook the attachment between infant and adult and to disre-
gard the psychological parent role in determining custody. In the
absence of statutory guidelines delineating the legal criteria
necessary in determining the best interests of the child, courts
may avoid focusing on the child and instead may rely on a
parental fitness standard, focusing on the parenting skills and
abilities while ignoring the child's psychological developmental
needs. A parental fitness standard tends to favor biological par-
ents. 14 Regardless of the approach, the current statutory for-
mulations do not adequately protect the child's developmental
and psychological needs.
III. A FEMINIST APPROACH
The current patriarchal jurisprudence is particularly problem-
atic in adoption cases because it frequently ignores the attach-
ment relationship between the child and the caregiver. Current
analysis focuses on the individual due process right of the parent
but ignores the relationship between the child and the caregiver.
The abstraction of due process allows no room for the importance
to the child of the psychological parent relationship. A legal
paradigm that would concern itself with the relationship would
be more useful. Feminist jurisprudence can provide a framework
in which to examine these relationships. A feminist approach to
the law is woman centered, from a woman's perspective. 15 This
approach scrutinizes the law and its relationship to society from
112. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. S 31-6-5-2 (Burns 1994).
113. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
114. See Note, supra note 41, at 454, 448 ("Under the parental fitness standard, the
natural parent's right to custody, based on the biological tie between parent and child,
is deemed to be superior to all others in the absence of a showing of unfitness.").
115. Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 35 (1990).
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a female point of view. 116 Feminist jurisprudence protects values
that are important to women and reflects women's experience. 117
No single, uniform method of feminist analysis of the legal system
exists. Rather, several schools have developed, each seeking to
remedy certain deficiencies in the patriarchal legal system.118
The first of the various feminist approaches is the equality
theory. The equality theory advances a uniform standard of
justice for all people. 119 Equality doctrine attempts to improve
the position of women by using civil rights statutes and the
Constitution, and applying law in a gender-neutral way. 20 Though
this doctrine may have been useful in certain settings, such as
the fight to receive equal pay, the equality theory has a limited
use. The theory is based on a "false neutrality" which ignores
the tension between legal equality and sexual difference between
women and men. 2' This perspective works within the "terms and
structures of the status quo."'' 2
Acceptance of the status quo can be harmful to true equality
because it relies on a system in which "social power and physical
security are unequally distributed between the sexes."' 23 Legally,
equal treatment of women does nothing to advance women who
have been systematically excluded from the lawmaking process.
Accepting the status quo looks toward the "end" of formal equal-
ity rather than taking context into account. Equality theorists
are more concerned about ensuring that a decision is legally
equal. They look to a preordained conclusion rather than deter-
mine a conclusion that advances women because of the context
of the dispute. The equality approach already has chosen an
outcome; it does not provide a method of examining new situa-
tions. As a result, the equality theory does not transfer easily
to situations in which the distribution of rights is not the central
116. Epstein, supra note 10, at 580 n.19.
117. See West, supra note 63, at 60 (Current jurisprudence does not protect the "values
women hold, the distinctive dangers from which we suffer ... because legal theory ...
is about actual, real life, enacted, legislated, adjudicated law, and women have, from law's
inception, lacked the power to make law protect, value, or seriously regard our experi-
ence.").
118. For a more detailed analysis of feminist legal theory, see, inter alia, Bender, supra
note 7; Epstein, supra note 10; FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, upra note 61; West, supra note
63; and FRuG, infra note 120.
119. Epstein, supra note 10, at 577.
120. MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 4-5 (1992).
121. Id. at 8.
122. Fineman, supra note 115, at 35.
123. FRUG, supra note 120, at 30.
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question. In an adoption setting, for example, the child and her
attachment relationship are the most important issues, not
whether rights are distributed equally among the adoptive and
biological parents. In resolving a disputed adoption, the equality
approach, like the patriarchal system, would enable a court to
avoid protecting the child by focusing on rights.
A second theory of feminist jurisprudence, proposed by Ca-
tharine MacKinnon, is the dominance approach. This school of
feminism describes sex discrimination in terms of power-men
have it and women do not.124 Dominance feminism describes "the.
systematic relegation of an entire group of people to a condition
of inferiority. 125 MacKinnon argues that the patriarchal system
"contributes to the maintenance of an under class ... because of
gender status."'12 The dominance approach tries to free women
from social subordination. 127
The dominance approach, however, also has a limited useful-
ness. Because not all disputes are conflicts between one who has
been systematically denied power and one who exerts dominance,
the principle is not clearly analogous to adoption questions. In
the adoption setting, male and female genders are on both sides
of the dispute. One woman will "win" and one will lose. Similar
to the patriarchal approach, the dominance approach does not
speak to the correct questions. Adoption is not about oppression
or intrusions into one's individuality, which are the questions
both dominance and patriarchy address, but rather, it is about
the establishment and maintenance of a family.
A third feminist jurisprudence promotes an "ethic of care," a
legal system premised on women's values of relationships and
connections.' 28 Such a legal system is feminist because it reflects
women's approach to problem solving, instead of men's ap-
proach.'2 Women make moral judgments based on caring and
responsibility rather than rights and abstractions.130 Young girls
develop emotional and psychological links to others early. This
124. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 61, at 87-88.
125. Id.
126. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 117 (1979).
127. Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 828 (1988)
(reviewing CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
128. Id. at 828.
129. Scales, supra note 9, at 1380.
130. Shaughnessy, supra note 59, at 3.
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approach could benefit the legal system by stressing the need to
strengthen relationships and build community. 13
Carol Gilligan developed the theory of the ethic of care after
researching the different approaches to moral dilemmas among
males and females of various ages. For example, when an eleven
year old boy and girl were asked if a man should steal a drug
necessary to save his wife from cancer, the boy replied that the
man certainly should steal the drug because a life is more valuable
than the medicine.132 The girl, on the other hand, answered that
the man should not steal the drug, but should find another way
to save his wife, perhaps by borrowing the money. She feared
that the man would be caught and sent to jail, eventually leading
to further harm to his wife. 133 The boy saw the moral dilemma
as a logical problem, essentially a mathematical equation. Because
a life is worth more than medicine, the theft is justified.1" The
girl, however, viewed the dilemma as a more complex web of
relationships, focusing on the wife's continued need for her hus-
band's care rather than the single event of obtaining the medi-
cine.131 Moral dilemmas for young girls focus on long-term effects
on relationships and the effects of the relationships on the play-
ers' lives. The dilemma for young boys is more individual and
immediate, and easier to calculate with abstractions of logic.
Where men prize individuality, women value more communitarian
systems.136
A legal system based on an ethic of care requires a contextual
interpretation of disputes that examines people's interconnection
and responsibility."37 This jurisprudence need not merely set a
minimum standard of conduct that is within the law, but may
also be used to elevate society.P A legal system based on caring
recognizes that all choices have an effect on other people, so that
we all must act to avoid harm to them. 139 Such a legal system
uses principled decision making to promote interests that patri-
archy ignores.
The ethic of care, like other feminist approaches, is vulnerable
to criticism. Some feminists warn that it may be advocating a
131. Id. at 3, 13.
132. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 25-26.
133. Id. at 28.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id. at 28.
136. Sherry, supra note 8, at 544-45.
137. Bender, supra note 7, at 31.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 32.
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position that harms women. The emphasis on caring encourages
people to inordinately value traditional domestic roles, excusing
self-sacrifice without addressing the fact that some women may
not be able to achieve a more respected position in society by
following this standard. 10 An ethic of care may result in less
empowerment for women and continued dependence on men
because it keeps women in caretaking positions, such as the
"mommy track."141 In addition, caring may be feminine simply
because men have valued women for that role. Caring would not,
therefore, be part of feminine nature, but rather would be the
result of subordination. 42
Though the ethic of care may risk criticism from others in the
feminist movement, it nonetheless provides a useful tool. The
sex-related differences in women's approach to moral problems
allow critiques of the dominant interpretation of the law. 143 In an
adoption context, an ethic of care specifically addresses relation-
ships and connections. The child's relationship and connection to
his or her caregiver is central to the child's emotional and
psychological development. 4' An ethic of care provides an anal-
ysis that recognizes, values, and preserves attachments. As such,
an ethic of care addresses the specific issues in disputed adoptions
that the patriarchal system ignores. Whereas the masculine sys-
tem primarily is concerned that all parties receive process, this
feminist approach assures that the just, moral result is achieved.1 45
IV. CASE LAW REGARDING DISPUTED ADOPTIONS
Because adoption statutes are ambiguous as to the protection
due the child and courts are bound by due process, the best
interests of the child are not central to adoption decisions in the
patriarchal system. Opinions address the best interests standard,
but in practice do not appear comfortable applying it. Courts
avoid making final determinations of the child's best interests,
either by grounding the decision in parental rights or by essen-
tially implying a presumption. This approach is possible because
the courts may focus on conflicting rights rather than on the
140. FRUG, supra note 120, at 48.
141. Id. at xiii-xiv.
142. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories. 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 202 (1989).
143. FRUG, supra note 120, at 40.
144. See supra notes 37-44.
145. Scales, supra note 9, at 1385.
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child. A feminist approach based on the ethic of care would allow
courts to address the relationship between the child and the
caregiver.
A. Decisions That Serve the Child's Best Interests
Many custody disputes during adoption proceedings arise be-
cause the biological mother attempts to revoke her consent to
the surrender of the child by alleging fraud or duress. One such
case from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, In re J.M.P.,16 dis-
cusses which circumstances vitiate consent, what the courts should
consider when a biological parent attempts to revoke her consent,
and how to determine the child's best interests. The biological
parents' consent to the adoption must be voluntary and in-
formed. 47 The parent must understand that in surrendering the
child for adoption, her parental rights cease.""8
Such consent, however, is invalid in certain circumstances. The
court reasoned that the act of surrender is essentially a contract;
therefore, error, fraud, and duress invalidate consent because
they nullify other agreements. 1 49 The court defined fraud as a
misrepresentation or an omission intended to obtain unjust ad-
vantage for one party or to cause the other party to suffer a
loss. 150 To fall within this definition, the misrepresentation must
involve a fact that has substantially influenced the parent to
consent to the surrender.'6 ' The surrender of the child is also
invalid when it is obtained by duress that would occasion a
reasonable fear of unjust and significant injury to the parent's
person, property, or reputation. 2 These contractual justifications
for a claim of invalid consent are affirmative defenses the natural
parent may raise when the adoptive parents attempt to enforce
the surrender agreement. Because these justifications are affir-
mative defenses, the natural parents have the burden of proving
the fraud or duress.1'3
146. In re J.M.P.. 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988).
147. Id. at 1007.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1008.
150. Id.
151. Id Courts rarely find circumstances clear enough to vitiate consent. An example
of fraud that would render consent invalid is if the lawyer managing the adoption overtly
lies to the biological mother about the terms of the consent agreement. In re BGD, 719
P.2d 1373 (Wyo. 1986).
152. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1008.
153. Id.
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When the biological parent attempted to revoke consent to the
surrender, the court in In re J.M.P. inquired into the best
interests of the child. Revocation does not necessarily halt the
adoption if proceeding with the adoption is in the child's best
interest.'54 Louisiana did not delineate the precise scope of the
best interest standard under the private adoption statute,'55 but
followed the premise of maintaining the individual human dignity
of the child.'1 The court defined the most important factors in
determining the child's best interests as: "(1) Whether each
person seeking custody is fit to be the child's parent;1 7 (2)
Whether either of the adoptive parents has a psychological re-
lationship with the child; and (3) The natural parent's biological
relationship with the child."''
The Louisiana Supreme Court followed an approach consistent
with an ethic of care when it reasoned that a custody award to
a psychological parent was preferred over a stranger to the child
in order to avoid unnecessary risk of harm to the child.169 Louis-
iana followed the scientific community's definition of psychological
parenthood,60 looking for the parent figure who has "day-to-day
interaction, companionship, and shared experiences.' 161 The court
recognized that "continuity of parental affection and care pro-
vides the basis for the child's sense of self-worth and security."1 62
This decision examined the context and the relationships between
the caregiver and the child. By using a contextual approach to
reward and maintain relationships, the court followed a model
consistent with feminist jurisprudence.'6
When no such relationship has been formed between the child
and the adoptive parents, however, the court would follow a
presumption in favor of the natural parents.'" The court placed
a high value on family, which reflects an ideology that the natural
parent-child relationship should remain intact unless it would
154. Id. at 1012.
155. Such a lack of specificity is typical of most state adoption statutes. See supra
notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
156. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1012-13.
157. Id. (maintaining that a parent is fit so long as he or she would not "endanger the
health of the child under minimum standards for child protection").
158. Id. at 1013.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 42.44 and accompanying text.
161. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1013.
162. Id. at 1014.
163. See supra notes 12842 and accompanying text.
164. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1015.
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subject the child to physical or psychological harm.16 5 The court
would not award custody to the biological parents if it determined
that the adoptive parents were the psychological parents because
removing the child from the psychological parent would cause
the child harm. 16 The preference for the biological parents re-
mains, however, within the court's calculations.
As evidenced in the result of the J.M.P. case, an absolute
prescription, the presumption in favor of biology, is inappropriate
in the determination of child custody. This presumption illustrates
a major flaw in patriarchal thinking: a willingness to apply
abstract rules rather than inquire into the realities of the situa-
tion. The court decided that the lower court "did not determine
whether there was a substantial psychological relationship ...
between the child and the adoptive parents and gave no apparent
weight to the child's biological relationship to the natural mother";
therefore, the court remanded the case for further fact-finding
on this issue. 87 The court made no mention of the quantum of
psychological relationship necessary. If a relationship existed at
all, the adoptive parents should be awarded custody,'6 and no
preference need be given to the biological status of the natural
parents. 69 The court essentially did not follow its own rationale
by deferring the final decision. The consideration of the biological
relation interfered with justice. This child was over two years
old and had been living with the adoptive parents since birth at
the time the opinion was written. 70 The court, therefore, should
not have been reluctant to find and validate a psychological
parent relationship. Clearly, the child's day-to-day needs were
met not by the biological mother, but by the custodial adoptive
parents. Remanding for further fact finding did nothing but
unnecessarily delay the final adoption decree. 17 The focus on the
rights of the biological parents only served to delay the adoption
and divert attention away from the child.
A later Louisiana case is more responsive to the child's best
interests. In re Baby Boy Smith 72 also had its origins in a claim
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1016.
168. Id. at 1013-14.
169. Id. at 1013-15.
170. Id. at 1022.
171. On remand, the adoptive parents were awarded custody and leave to file for a
final decree of adoption. Pontiff v. Behrens, 536 So. 2d 424 (La. 1989). Remanding,
therefore, accomplished nothing more than further delaying the final custody determi-
nation.
172. 602 So. 2d 144 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
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of invalid surrender, but the Court of Appeal of Louisiana quickly
disposed of that argument, citing that the biological mother was
not subject to any duress, had the benefit of counsel, and testified
that she knew she would not automatically be awarded custody
if she revoked her consent. Her attempt to revoke consent was
timely, however, so the court of appeal needed to determine the
best interests of the child in order to decide if the adoption could
go forward or if the revocation of consent would be allowed. 74
The court had the aid of a licensed psychologist who testified
that a disruption in the bonding process that takes place between
child and caregiver during the first year of life would likely doom
the child to "eventually develop interpersonal relationship prob-
lems."175 Another expert concurred that the child had formed a
bond with the adoptive parents and that removal of the child
from their custody would be "catastrophic" and could lead to
"incredible problems in [his] emotional and social development."1 76
The court followed the J.M.P. rule on ascertaining the best
interests, and concluded that there was no error in the lower
court finding that the prospective adoptive parents and the child
had formed an attachment. The court reasoned that, therefore,
the attachment should not be severed lest it harm the child. 177
Expert witnesses contributed to the quality of the decision in
the Baby Boy Smith case. The importance of psychological par-
enthood was not an intellectual abstract, but was discernible
from the context of that specific child's development. 78 The court
could not have postponed a determination of the child's attach-
ments as it did in the J.M.P. decision. The court addressed the
interconnection between the caregiver and the child, recognizing
it as something to be legally protected. Such reasoning is consis-
tent with the goals of feminist jurisprudence, as it extends the
protection of law to the historically undervalued relationship
between the child and the psychological parent.
B. Decisions That Avoid the Child's Best Interests
Illinois courts have not used the best interests of the child in
adoption disputes and have failed to protect the relationship
173. I at 146.
174. Id at 147.
175. Id. at 148.
176. I&
177. Id. at 148-49.
178. Ird at 148.
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between the child and the psychological parent, as seen in the
recent case In re Baby Boy Janikova.1'7 Though the intermediate
appellate court decided custody based on the child's best inter-
ests,180 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, on the grounds that
the lower court "wholly [missed] the threshold issue" by dwelling
on the best interests of the child. 18' The court decided that
parental rights were more important than the child's best inter-
ests in determining custody. 8 2 The Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sion is a perfect example of the damage a court can do to a child
by ignoring her interests, by being too wrapped up in the patri-
archal system to understand that the child's relationship was
precious and worthy of legal protection.
The intermediate court, on the other hand, appeared to use a
model that, like a feminist model, based the analysis on the child
and his relationships. The appellate court defined the child as
the "real party in interest" and as such, his interests were
superior to any others, including biological and adoptive parental
rights and interests.183 The court allowed no exception to the
principle that the child's interests are paramount-"a child's best
interest is and must remain inviolate and impregnable from all
other factors, including the interests of the parents."'184 The court
did not use a balancing test. Rather, it stated that when the
interests of the child and parent conflict, "the rights and interests
of the parents must yield."'18
While adamantly endorsing the best interests standard, the
appellate court did not precisely define nor follow a set of
guidelines to implement the standard. Rather, the court took a
common sense approach: "there comes a point when we should
not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men and women."'86
Essentially, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the child
bonded with the adoptive parents and that it would be detri-
mental to dissolve that relationship. Considering the fact that
the baby was placed with the adoptive parents when he was four
days old and had lived continuously with them ever since that
179. 638 N.E.2d 181 (IM. 1994).
180. In re Baby Boy, 627 N.E.2d 648 (IIl. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd sub nom., In re Baby
Boy Janikova, 638 N.E.2d 181 (I1. 1994).
181. In re Baby Boy Janikova, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182.
182. Id.
183. In re Baby Boy, 627 N.E.2d at 652.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 654.
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placement, removing him from his home and family and the only
parents that he had ever known would not further the best
interests of the child.'18
The decision is a recognition of psychological parenthood, val-
uing the attachment between the child and the caregiver over
biology. The decision is "a recognition in the law that it takes
more to being a parent than being one of the sexual partners to
the physiological formation of a child."''1 The Illinois Appellate
Court recognized, valued, and protected the attachment relation-
ship between the child and his psychological parents. By identi-
fying the relationship as superior to other interests, the court
used an ethic of care. The context and connection between the
child and psychological parent was cardinal to the decision; the
decision, therefore, was consistent with feminist values.
The court needed no further basis for enforcing the adoption
once it determined that it was in the baby's interest to remain
with the adoptive parents, because the court emphatically placed
the best interest of the child above all other potential interests. 8 9
The court itself said that there was no exception to the supremacy
of the child's interests. 19
After concluding that it was in the interests of the child to
remain with the adoptive parents, the court found that the
biological father was unfit so that his consent was. unnecessary
to the adoption. 91 The court declared him unfit because he never
confronted or wrote to the mother about the birth, never con-
tacted the physician caring for the mother or delivering the child,
never expressed concern for the welfare of his child, nor tried
to name the baby. 92 The mother, however, refused to identify
the father and later lied to him, telling him that the baby died. 93
When the father began to suspect that the child had survived,
he left the mother messages indicating his suspicions, and inves-
tigated her residence looking for signs of the child.'9 4 He discov-
ered the adoption more than two months after the child had been
born. After this discovery, he sought to intercede in the adoption
with the aid of an attorney. 95
187. Id. at 650, 653-54.
188. Id. at 653.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 18185.
190. In re Baby Boy, 627 N.E.2d at 653.
191. Id. at 654.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 650.
194. Id. at 650-51.
195. Id.
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Such behavior is not that of an unconcerned parent. The father
was poor and a recent immigrant to the United States. 196 He was
uninformed of the birth and surrender of his child. He had no
reason to seek the aid of a lawyer within the first thirty days
after the child's birth as the court would have required of a fit
parent.197 The finding that the father lacked interest and concern
in his child' 98 is disingenuous and inconsistent with the father's
behavior. He looked for signs of the baby, and when he finally
was apprised of the situation, he took action.
One can only conclude the court felt the need to find an
alternate reason for allowing the adoption to stand. The court
was uncomfortable with interfering in parental rights despite its
endorsement of the best interest standard. The court was intel-
lectually dishonest as to the fitness of the biological father. It
did not have to address that issue in order to adequately address
the real party in interest. By its own rule, the court need not
have gone further than finding that the baby was best served
by remaining with the adoptive family.' 99 It is tragic that the
father was lied to and lost his child through no acts of his own,
but that tragedy does not overcome the supremacy of the baby's
interests.200
The tragedy also enabled a court to ignore the child. On appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the child was irrelevant
to the decision.201 Rights analysis compelled the court to focus
on the father's due process instead of the child's emotional and
psychological well being.202 The deficiencies of the rights analysis
as opposed to a feminist ethic of care are clear. Rights-based
decisions consider children the property of their birth parents,
without inquiring into their interest in growing up in a loving,
caring home.2 03 The damage to the child in this case cannot be
underestimated. Denis Donovan, Director of the Children's Center
for Developmental Psychiatry in St. Petersburg, Florida, says of
the child in the Illinois case, "His world is the world in which he
196. Id. at 649.
197. Id. at 654.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 652-53.
200. See id.
201. In re Baby Boy Janikova, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994) (concluding that the
father's parental interests were improperly terminated, and thus the appellate court was
wrong to dwell on the best interests of the child).
202. Id.
203. Ann Scott Tyson, Rival Parents Clash over Adopted Child, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 18, 1994, at 7.
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has grown up ... forcing the child to leave his family would mean
the total disruption and turnover of his world." 204
The people of Illinois have expressed great displeasure with
the Illinois Supreme Court's analysis of the father's rights over-
taking the child's. In the weeks following the decision, hundreds
of people called the Illinois Supreme Court criticizing the deci-
sions and begging the justices to reconsider. 0 5 Even the governor
of the state attempted to intervene by requesting a rehearing.
He eventually called a special session of the legislature in order
to reform Illinois adoption laws, and required a hearing on the
best interests of the child.205
The Illinois Supreme Court also lacked an understanding of
the attachment relationship. Instead of perceiving the relation-
ship between the adoptive parents and Baby Boy as a caring
relationship in which the parents tended to the child's psycholog-
ical -needs and emotional development, the court interpreted a
best interest standard as requiring a decision to be based on the
financial resources and the educational background of the par-
ents.207 Those criteria are not part of the best interests calculus;
instead, the psychological parent relationship is determinative of
the best interests. 25
A decision using an ethic of care would not have totally
disrupted the child's world. The feminist approach would have
examined the context of his world, and preserved the important
relationships. 209 Part of the context may have been that the
biological father wanted to provide a loving, nurturing home for
his child, but transcending the father's plans would be the child's
reality of being in a loving, nurturing home and experiencing
attachment relationships that were inestimably important to his
psychological and emotional well being.210 The feminist ethic of
care would have elevated the relationship between the child and
adoptive parents and protected it from threats to the relation-
ship.211
204. Id.
205. David Bailey, Public Importunes High Court in "Baby Richard" Adoption Case,
CHi. DAILY L. BULL., July 8, 1994, at 1.
206. Tyson, supra note 203, at 7.
207. Id.
208. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE AcT 5 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1988); see also In re
Baby Boy Smith, 602 So. 2d 144, 148 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (determining the best interests
of the child based on relational factors).
209. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
211. The negative response by the people of Illinois to the decision points to their
desire to elevate and protect the relationship between the child and adoptive parents.
See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
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The most famous of the recently disputed adoptions, the Baby
Jessica case, In re Baby Girl Clausen,212 was another decision
that ignored the best interests of the child. Using a masculine
preference for process, 213 the Baby Jessica case was decided on
procedural grounds. The Michigan Supreme Court denied juris-
diction to modify an earlier Iowa decision terminating the adop-
tion.21 4 In doing so, the court addressed Jessica's best interests
and due process rights in family life, but dismissed the due
process claim and Jessica's petition for lack of standing.215
Two weeks after she was born, on February 25, 1991, the
adoptive parents, the DeBoers, acquired custody of Jessica and
filed a petition for adoption.216 One week later, the mother, Cara
Clausen, revoked her consent to the adoption and admitted to
having lied about the father's true identity. 17 One month after
custody changed hands, the correctly identified father petitioned
the Iowa courts to intervene in the adoption.20 1 8 On December 27,
1991, an Iowa district court denied the DeBoers' petition to adopt
Jessica because there was no finding that the biological father's
rights were terminated or that he had abandoned the child. 21 9
Lacking abandonment, Iowa was not required to inquire into the
baby's best interests.220. The DeBoers' Iowa appeals resulted in
affirmations of the original finding that the biological father had
not surrendered his rights; thus, the DeBoers' rights as guardians
were terminated in December of 1992.22 The same day that their
guardianship was terminated, the DeBoers requested in Michigan,
their state of residence, a temporary restraining order and pe-
tition to enjoin the Iowa custody order, or in the alternative, to
modify it to award custody to the DeBoers.22 By the time the
Michigan actions reached their final appeals, it was the summer
of 1993, two and one-half years after custody originally changed.
Michigan decided that under the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA)2s and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
212. 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
213. Scales, supra note 9, at 1385.
214. In re Baby Girl Clausen. 502 N.W.2d at 652.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 652-54.
217. Id. at 652.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 652-53.
220. Id. at 653.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. S 600.651-.673 (West 1981).
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(PKPA),24 it had no jurisdiction to alter the Iowa decision and
must enforce it. The UCCJA was designed to determine when a
state may take jurisdiction from another state and when a state
may modify another state's custody order. Iowa properly ex-
ercised jurisdiction over the original claim and the PKPA "em-
phatically imposes the requirement that sister-state custody orders
be given effect."22 States must recognize custody determinations
if made within the confines of the uniform acts. 7 The Michigan
courts were obligated to give full faith and credit to Iowa's valid
judgment.m
The purpose of the UCCJA and PKPA is to "avoid jurisdic-
tional competition" of the sort in which the DeBoers were at-
tempting to engage.m The explicit legislative purpose for the
PKPA was to prevent "the disregard of court orders, excessive
relitigation of cases, [and] obtaining of conflicting orders of var-
ious jurisdictions," 230 because the result otherwise is "harm to
the welfare of children and their parents or other custodians."' 1
The Acts give priority to certainty and stability following a
policy that, in disputes rife with injustice, consistency eliminates
injustice to the greatest extent possible.232
Michigan valued certainty and procedure over relationships
and context, and thus, the best interests of Jessica. The DeBoers
attacked the Iowa decision as contrary to Michigan policy because
it involved no best interests hearing.P The Michigan court de-
clared that it was consistent with state policy to avoid a hearing
on the chjild's best interests because the previous cases recognize
some situations in which such a hearing is unnecessary.2 In
addition, because the DeBoers did not have a legally recognized
claim to custody, they had no right to a best interests hearing.P5
224. 28 U.S.C. S 1738A (1988).
225. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 654-55 & nn.15-17.
226. Id. at 655.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 656.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 657 (quoting Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611 5
7(a3-4), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. S 1738A (1988))) (alteration in
original).
231. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-611 S 7(a)(3-4), 94 Stat. 3569).
232. Id. at 658, 660.
233. Id. at 660.
234. Id. at 66162. For example, if the biological father establishes a custodial relation-
ship or has supported the mother or the child, his parental rights may not be terminated
regardless of the child's best interests. Id.
235. Id. at 662.
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Context and the connection between Jessica and the DeBoers
were ignored in favor of the patriarchal abstraction of rights.
The specific situation of the DeBoers and Jessica was irrelevant
to the court's analysis.
Jessica, through her guardian ad litem, petitioned the court
for a best interests hearing based on her interest in a family
relationship with the DeBoers. 5 Michigan recognized that chil-
dren have a due process interest in the family, but did not
recognize it as independent from the parents' rights. The court
held that a parent's due process rights are congruous with the
child's interests unless the parent is unfit. A parent's right to
custody, therefore, is not to be disturbed, even if contrary to the
child's explicit preferences and interests.m While professing that
the best interests of the child were of the greatest importance,
the court continued, "we never have interpreted such [a] rule so
as to deprive a parent of the custody of his or her child, unless
it was shown that the parent was an unsuitable person to have
such custody."23 In addition, the court noted that "minors' rights
to independently assert rights regarding their custody and care"
are limited.2 0
The court claimed that there was a concurrence of interests
between Jessica and her biological parents. Jessica had not seen
her biological parents, however, for over two and a half years.241
Her interests had become intertwined with the DeBoers' lives.
They were the people who cared for her daily needs; the biological
parents played no part in Jessica's daily life. When a child is in
the custody of a third party,
any prior relationship with the biological parent deteriorates
to the point that it is supplanted by the latter relationship. A
child may ... look upon the third party as his true parent. At
this point, a return of custody to the natural ... parent ...
would work considerable emotional harm on the child.242
236. Id. at 665.
237. I&
238. I& at 666.
239. Id- (quoting Liebert v. Derse, 15 N.W.2d 720 (Mich. 1944)).
240. Id. at 667.
241. Similar to In re Baby Boy Janikova, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994), Jessica's biological
father did not know of her birth or the fact that her biological mother had surrendered
parental rights. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 652. He too appears to be an
innocent victim. His desire to have a relationship with his child should not be cavalierly
terminated, but the focus must remain on Jessica. The fact that the biological father is
"innocent" is an Inadequate justification for him to prevail.
242. Litt, supra note 14, at 136.
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It was impossible for the biological parents to be psychological
parents, as they had been absent from Jessica's entire life.243 Her
best interests, therefore, could not be served by awarding custody
to the absent biological parents. 4l Jessica's interests had di-
verged from those of her biological parents. The court preferred
the adults' due process rights over any consideration of the
relationship between the child and caregiver. By saying that the
interests of Jessica and her biological parents were the same,
the court, in effect, denied that Jessica had any protectable
interest in the relationship with her psychological parents.
The Michigan Supreme Court's preference for the biological
parents is archaic and projects a sense that the child is a "sub-
person over whom the parent has an absolute possessory inter-
est."245 This preference is a clear flaw in the patriarchal system
for deciding custody disputes. The best interests test is the most
widely used and well-accepted analysis to resolve custody dis-
putes 14 6 This analysis leads to both a legally and morally superior
claim for the child. 247 In addition, the purposes of the uniform
acts were not furthered in this case. Though aimed at protecting
the child, the court's application of the PKPA, by focusing "ex-
clusively on the concerns of competing adults, as if this were a
dispute about the vesting of contingent remainders, reduces the
PKPA to a robot of legal formality with results that Congress
did not intend."us An overly precise approach to the UCCJA
turns the child into a "pawn" in a "jurisdictional chess game";
instead, when exercising discretion within the boundaries of the
UCCJA and PKPA, a court should consider their underlying
policies which aim to ensure a stable right to custody in the best
interest of the child, as well as the exact words of the statutes.24 9
By refusing to inquire into Jessica's best interests,2 the court
failed to further these goals.
243. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
245. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 669 (Levin, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. Id, at 670.
248. Id. at 671.
249. Id at 680-81 (citations omitted).
250. In a final appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Stevens denied
Jessica a best interests hearing, claiming that the relationship between the child and the
DeBoer's developed "after it became clear that they were not entitled to adopt her ....
'[Clourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home
appears more advantageous."' DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (Stevens, Circuit Justice
1993) (alteration in original) (quoting In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (1992)). In this
statement, Justice Stevens acknowledged that Jessica's best interest was to remain with
her adoptive family, but ignored that conclusion in favor of rights analysis.
1994] 249
250 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 1:217
Ironically, the UCCJA and PKPA, which were designed to
ensure procedural certainty to resolve disputes with finality for
the child, instead have the opposite effect. They allow the de-
struction of deep attachments, as with Jessica DeBoer. Such an
adverse outcome results from a rights-based approach. By ignor-
ing context and relationships, which a feminist approach would
have examined, courts are able to frustrate the stated goals of
maintaining and protecting the parent-child relationship. Intui-
tively, it is clear that the feminist approach would not have this
problem. Not only would the goal of the law be the maintenance
of a parent-child relationship, but it would also be the basis for
the decision. The central factual question would be whether and
with whom there is a psychological parent relationship. The
UCCJA and PKPA use a totally different analysis from the
feminist model. By their nature, the UCCJA and PKPA do not
focus on the child, but on the jurisdiction of courts in deciding
matters regarding the child.21 When courts ignore the child's
interests and address jurisdictional questions, one cannot expect
that decisions will be favorable to the child.
V. OTHER OPTIONS TO BETTER PRESERVE THE CHILD'S BEST
INTERESTS
What could the Michigan and Illinois Supreme Courts have
done? The courts' hands were not tied. The courts could have
protected the attachment relationships. In Baby Jessica's situa-
tion, this protection would have been possible through a finding
that the PKPA and UCCJA authorized Michigan to exercise
jurisdiction over the dispute because it was the child's home
state.0 2 The PKPA defines the child's home state as the home
where the child lived with the parent or parent-figure for the
six consecutive months prior to the proceeding.2 3 Congress spe-
cifically intended to protect family relationships as opposed to
biological relationships with such a definition of home.21 Michigan
could easily interpret the PKPA to confer jurisdiction, and,
therefore, determine custody on the merits, by focusing on Jes-
251. In re B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032, 1041 (D.C. 1989) (holding that though the "key figure
in [the] woeful drama" is the child, the decision is not regarding the child's fate, but
rather which court will have "ultimate responsibility for making that determination").




sica's attachment to the DeBoers and her interest in remaining
with them.
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court could have used a best
interests analysis in which the child is the true party in inter-
est.2 5 Under such an analysis, no other interest may take prec-
edence over the child's. The courts could have allowed the children
to intervene. Under a traditional analysis of standing, the children
have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. To have stand-
ing in a dispute, a party must show that he or she personally
suffered an injury resulting from the actions of the other party.2"
A favorable decision must be likely to compensate the injury.27
The injury must be particular and real, not hypothetical.26 In
determining if a party has standing, the court must consider if
the injury is too abstract or inappropriate, if the causal link
between the defendant's behavior and the plaintiff's harm is
sufficiently related, and if relief for the harm is too conjectural.2 9
Advisory opinions are disfavored; by requiring a party to have
standing, courts enforce the policy that questions to the court
will have a precise application, "not in the rarified atmosphere
of a debating society."26w
Children in disputed private adoptions clearly have standing.
For example, they can identify the precise and individual harm
of being removed from psychological parents and placed with
strangers with whom they have no attachment. Such a result
will cause harm to the children's ability to form new relationships
and may impair their development,261 and this harm is directly
linked to the actions of the parents. There is no question that
the children merely have an abstract injury only tenuously re-
lated to the behavior of other parties to the dispute. A child has
standing to enter the fray, and her claims and interests must be
addressed by the court. When the child's needs are not addressed,
as in the Baby Jessica and Baby Boy Janikova cases, the decisions
are not only harmful to the child, but unconscionable. The party
with the most at stake in the dispute is ignored. The party whose
life and well being depend on the court is overlooked as having
no interest in the outcome.
255. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
256. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
257. I&
258. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
259. Id. at 752.
260. Valey Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
261. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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In addition to recognizing that the child has standing, the court
should put the disputed adoption on an expedited schedule. The
court should elevate result over process, as is done in an ethic
of care model6 2 Delays and prolonged conflict in resolving cus-
tody disputes are contrary to the best interests of the child.263
Some courts recognize compelling financial reasons as adequate
hardship to justify an expedited proceeding.26 If financial reasons
are sufficiently compelling to merit expedited proceedings, surely
a child's future is also a compelling reason. Other courts are
more reluctant to grant emergency relief that modifies the "first-
in first-out" system, rarely finding exceptional need or urgency.265
In truly working towards the best interests of the child, however,
a court should recognize the exceptional need for urgency. The
child's abilities to form attachments and develop emotionally are
in jeopardy when the proceedings and appeals are delayed.2 6 In
order to enable the child to develop, there is exceptional need
for quick resolution. The child's future should not be decided at
the same speed as a securities fraud conflict or an injury com-
pensation dispute.
Courts are reluctant to rush decisions in complex litigation
with profound implications on the parties.217 A custody dispute
could fairly be described as such a multi-issue case with lasting
effect on both the parties and third parties. Though one would
like to ensure that courts take care with all decisions, haste could
threaten the care taken in reaching the conclusion. The urgency
of the child's developmental needs, however, outweighs the con-
cerns of carelessness. 8  The child would be served best by a
swift determination of custody so as to enter into a lasting
attachment as early as possible. The interference with autonomy
and individual rights is not as great a danger as the interference
with the child's relationship.28 9
262. Scales, supra note 9, at 1385.
263. Melissa Douthart Philbrick, Agreements to Arbitrate Post-Divorce Custody Disputes,
18 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 419, 425 (1985) ("[A] child's exaggerated sense of time
magnifies the emotional impact of any delay.").
264. See, e.g., In re Investigation into Gen. Order Forty-Five, 542 A.2d 288, 289 (Vt.
1988).
265. Nation Magazine v. Department of State, 805 F. Supp. 68, 73 (D.D.C. 1992).
266. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., In re Investigation into Gen. Order Forty-Five, 542 A.2d at 289 (denying
a motion for expedited adjudication).
268. See Philbrick, supra note 263, at 461 ("As in any judicial system, there is a risk
that the perfect solution will not be reached in every case.").
269. Tyson, supra note 203, at 7.
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Expedition need not result in careless decisions. A new option
for speeding up the process of resolving custody disputes is
necessary. Some commentators have recommended greater reli-
ance on arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute reso-
lution.PO The lack of finality with these methods, however, remains
a problem.
Furthermore, in some cases, alternative dispute resolution is
not practical because the parties are unlikely to approach the
bargaining table willing to compromise. 271 The solution in such
cases is to continue to hear adoption disputes in traditional courts
while closely managing the litigation. Implementing a litigation
structure with limited time for discovery, hard-and-fast deadlines,
and early trial dates would reduce dramatically the time of
litigation.2 2 Although procedural options and mandatory meas-
ures to quicken the pace of adoption litigation may create some
risk of unfairness in that a full range of litigation strategies may
be limited, 273 such a risk is justifiable to ensure the child's best
interests. The dispute must be resolved with an eye toward
finality before the child's attachment to the custodial family
becomes too solid. Ideally, the dispute would be resolved before
the child turned three months old. This time frame, however,
may be unrealistic in light of overburdened courts. In order to
protect the child, the dispute should be resolved within three
months of revocation of consent. Revocation would occur before
the child turned six weeks old. Custody would then be settled
either prior to any attachment having formed, or so early into
the formation of attachment that the child would not suffer great
developmental disruption. 274
VI. CONCLUSION
Patriarchal jurisprudence addresses intrusion into one's auton-
omy. This intrusion is not a relevant issue in a disputed adoption.
The masculine approach to law overlooks children in disputed
adoptions because they are not fully autonomous individuals. The
dangers unique to infants therefore are not addressed by the
patriarchal system.
270. Philbrick, supra note 263, passim
271. See Richard McMillan, Jr., & David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431 (1985).
272. Id. at 439.
273. Id. at 442.
274. See supra notes 20-21, 37-39, 101-02 and accompanying text.
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The dignity of the child should be the paramount concern of
the courts in adoption disputes. Neither the biological nor adop-
tive parents should be presumptively more deserving of custody.
Instead, the courts must examine the relationship between the
child and the parent. A true best interests test would focus on
keeping the child with her psychological parent. The quality of
the tie between the child and the family should be the chief
interest in determining custody. If the child has not yet formed
an attachment to the adoptive family, there would not necessarily
be any added harm by granting the biological family custody.
Indeed, if no attachment has formed while the child has been in
the care of the adoptive family for some months, that lack of
attachment may be an indication that the adoptive family is not
adequately seeing to the needs of the child. In such a situation,
a finding of unfitness is justified. The child's interests would
surely be served by removing the child and awarding custody to
the family eagerly seeking to see to his or her needs. Such
situations, however, appear to be rare in the case law. Generally,
the child has formed some attachment to the adoptive family.
Under such circumstances, the child should not be removed from
the object of attachment. Protecting the psychological relation-
ship would be consistent with the feminist model of altering the
legal system to employ an ethic of care.
Though some decisions may be reached on grounds other than
the child's interests, such as the jurisdictional basis for the
Michigan decision in the Baby Jessica case, courts should not
avoid the question of the child's interests. Although it may be a
more factually difficult determination, courts must not shy away
from the hard decisions. The legal system is a powerful tool that
can be used to protect those who are not important in the
patriarchal rights analysis, such as children. An ethic of care
would be more responsive to the children. Factors such as the
time in which a child has been in the custody of the adoptive
parents, the quality of attachment between the child and the
family, and the age of the child all enter into a feminist analysis.
A court that consciously diverges from the child's interests
reaches an unconscionable decision. The child is more likely to
have an affection relationship with the parents who have been
caring for him or her than the parents who are °biologically
responsible for his or her presence. 275
275. If the dispute is resolved quickly enough, before the child is three or four months
old, the attachment to the custodial parents will still be fairly weak. Thus, the infant
would suffer less harm by a change in custody than if the resolution occurred after the
first five to six months of her life. See supra notes 19-24, 47-55 and accompanying text.
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Children's interests are not always served by returning them
to their natural parents in disputed adoptions. The current legal
system is bound by constitutionally protected rights of biological
parents to raise their children. Due process rights obscure the
true issue. Society has a responsibility to its children to protect
their attachment to their caregivers. A legal system that ac-
knowledges this responsibility will protect the relationship from
intrusions that may sever the connection between child and
caregiver. A legal system following a feminist jurisprudence,
using women's experiences and values as a model for the law,
will best serve the child.
